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Pouvons-nous montrer que les ménages ajustent leurs portefeuilles d'actifs juste 
avant leur départ à la retraite en réponse aux conditions de ressources donnant droit à 
une pension gouvernementale? Nous examinons cette question par l'estimation d'un 
système d'équations d'actifs dont la somme est contrainte par la valeur nette du 
patrimoine des ménages. Nous trouvons peu d’éléments suggérant qu'en 2006 les 
ménages ou les couples en bonne santé aient répondus aux incitants inhérents à 
l’examen des ressources donnant droit à une pension publique en modifiant leurs choix 
de portefeuille. Bien qu'il existe des différences importantes entre les portefeuilles 
d'actifs liés au fait d'être près du seuil de revenu éligible, de l'âge de la retraite, et d'être 
en mauvaise santé, ces différences ne sont souvent que marginalement significatives, 
ne sont pas robustes dans le temps, et ne sont pas clairement compatibles avec les 
incitants inhérents aux règles d’éligibilité donnant droit à une pension publique. En 
2006, aucune réponse comportementale  aux conditions de ressources ne semble se 
produire chez les retraités célibataires en mauvaise santé. Une comparaison avec les 
résultats de 2002 indique que les incitants à réaffecter  les actifs ont pu s’affaiblir au fil 
du temps. 
 1 Introduction
Countries around the world are struggling with the challenges associated with providing old-age
support to an ever increasing share of their populations. The dramatic expansion in the fraction of
those over the age of 65 ￿ in the face of a constant, or in some cases even declining, workforce-
age population (see Gruber, 2001; Visco, 2002) ￿ has raised serious concerns about pay-as-you-go
funding mechanisms. Many countries have responded by moving to reduce their public-pension
liabilities through increases in the retirement age, enhanced means testing of public pensions, and
incentives for private savings (OECD, 2007). Means testing can reduce overall pension costs by
targeting limited government resources towards those elderly in the greatest need (Knox, 1995) and
younger cohorts of workers appear to have reacted to the general trend in the downsizing of public
pensions by increasing their voluntary savings for old age (see B￿rsch-Supan, 1996; B￿rsch-Supan
and Reil-Held, 1998). At the same time, means testing results in higher effective marginal tax rates
that can lead to disincentives to save before or to accept employment after retirement age (Knox,
1995). Understanding the substitution effects between the alternative pillars of retirement income
is crucial for understanding the consequences of government pension reforms at both the micro
and macro level (B￿rsch-Supan and Reil-Held, 1998).
The objective of this paper is to shed light on this issue by assessing whether there is any evi-
dence that households adjust their asset portfolios just prior to retirement in order to maximize their
eligibility for a means-tested public pension. To this end, we take advantage of recently-available,
detailed micro data for a nationally-representative sample of Australian households. Unlike pre-
vious researchers, we allow asset composition to depend on net worth and estimate a system of
asset equations with cross-equation restrictions imposed to ensure that the adding-up requirement
is met (see Blau and Graham, 1990). Australia provides an interesting case for studying these is-
sues because it has had a universal ￿ but targeted ￿ age pension ￿nanced from general revenues for
a century. The introduction of a mandatory, employer-based pension system in 1992 implies that
Australian retirement income policy now approximates the three pillar approach common in de-
veloped countries (Bateman and Ablett, 2000).1 Despite this, the Australian age pension remains
the central mechanism for ensuring adequate retirement incomes with approximately 75 percent of
Australians aged 65 and older in receipt of the age pension in 2008.2
Against this institutional backdrop, we are particularly interested in the following questions.
How do the portfolio choices of pre- and post-retirement period households differ? Second, are
these differences consistent with households managing their wealth in a way that maximizes ac-
1The three pillars of retirement income are generally considered to be: 1) public pensions and social security;
2) employer pension plans; and 3) private retirement income. Some researchers also refer to a fourth pillar which
encompases intergenerational transfers (see, for example, B￿rsch-Supan and Reil-Held, 1998).
2Authors’ calculation based on the number of Age Pensions and the total population aged 65 plus (Australian
Bureau of Statistics, 2008; Harmer, 2009).
1cess to the Australian age pension? These questions are important in shedding light on the capacity
of public policy to ￿ either intentionally or unintentionally ￿ affect the way that households save
for old age. The life cycle hypothesis provides the foundation for much of the economic the-
ory surrounding the level and timing of (dis)savings and consumption in old age,3 but is often less
useful in understanding how households structure their wealth portfolios. The riskiness of a house-
holds’ retirement income, however, is ultimately driven by the structure of its asset portfolio.4 The
manner in which public pensions are means tested is likely to affect not only the incentive to save
generally, but also the incentive to structure wealth portfolios in particular ways. Moreover, gender
differences in longevity mean that these issues are particularly salient for elderly women who are
often much more dependent on public pensions (Preston and Austen, 2001; Jefferson and Preston,
2005).
We ￿nd little evidence that in 2006 healthy households or couples are responding to the incen-
tives embedded in the asset and income tests used to determine Australian age pension eligibility
by reallocating their assets. While there are some signi￿cant differences in asset portfolios associ-
ated with having an income near the income threshold, being of pensionable age, and being in poor
health these differences are often only marginally signi￿cant, are not robust across time, and are
not clearly consistent with the incentives inherent in the Australian age pension eligibility rules.
Any behavioral response to the incentives inherent in the age-pension means test in 2006 appears
to be predominately concentrated among single pensioners who are in poor health. In 2002 there
is also evidence that healthy households above pension age held signi￿cantly more wealth in their
homes than did otherwise similar younger households perhaps suggesting some reduction in the
incentives to reallocate assets over time.
In the next section, we brie￿y present some important features of the institutional context,
in particular the means tests, underlying the Australian age pension which are pertinent to our
research questions. We then discuss the details of the data and present descriptive statistics for our
estimation sample. The empirical strategy and regression results are presented and discussed in
Section 4. Our conclusions and suggestions for future research are outlined in Section 5.
2 The Australian Age Pension
The Australian age pension was introduced in 1909 in an effort to alleviate poverty amongst older
Australians. From its inception, receipt of the age pension has always been subject to means
tests that, until the 1980s, were frequently changed, usually in the direction of expanded access
to the age pension (see Knox, 1995). The Australian government moved in the 1980s, however,
3See (Blau, 2008) for a recent example.
4See B￿rsch-Supan and Reil-Held (1998) who discuss the risk in terms of both variation in and inadequacy of
retirement income.
2to increase targeting of the age pension by tightening the means test and introducing an asset test.
Minimum compulsory employer pension contributions were also introduced in 1992 in an effort to
extend private pension coverage to a broad group of labor market participants (Atkinson, Creedy,
and Knox, 1999; Bateman and Ablett, 2000; Preston and Austen, 2001). This ￿ along with tax
incentives to encourage private savings ￿ are expected to reduce future cohorts’ reliance on the age
pension (Preston and Austen, 2001). Until then, however, the age pension remains the primary
mechanism for delivering retirement income to more than two million Australians over the age of
65 (Harmer, 2009).
Eligibility for the age pension is contingent on a residency requirement and age restriction.5
Men become eligible at age 65, while women’s eligibility is in the process of being gradually
increased from age 60 in 1995 to age 65 by 2014.6 Bene￿ts are determined by tests of both income
and assets ￿ whichever results in the lowest payment ￿ making the arbitrage between the optimal
levels of income and assets very complex. Age pensioners also receive subsidies for health care,
pharmaceuticals, public transport, utilities and rent assistance. As a result, there is an incentive
at the margin to qualify for a small pension in order to take advantage of the various additional,
lump-sum bene￿ts derived from these subsidies.
Many researchers have argued that the speci￿cs of these income and asset tests generate incen-
tives for households to structure their retirement assets in particular ways (see Atkinson, Creedy,
and Knox, 1995; Barrett and Tseng, 2008; Cho and Sane, 2009). The 2006 income test, for ex-
ample, resulted in a reduction in pension bene￿t payments of between $0.40 (couples) and $0.20
(singles) for each dollar of income received, derived, or earned in excess of an income disregard
each fortnight. In particular, ￿nancial investments are assumed (or ￿deemed￿) to have earned a
speci￿c, ￿xed rate of interest regardless of the return that they are actually providing.7 This partic-
ular aspect of the income test may give households an incentive to reallocate their ￿nancial wealth
towards riskier ￿nancial assets that are expected to yield returns exceeding the deemed rate set by
government rather than safer ￿nancial assets that yield returns lower than the deemed rate. Thus,
we expect that the way in which households hold their ￿nancial wealth may be affected by the
deeming rules. It is less clear how the deeming rules might affect the incentives to hold ￿nancial
wealth in general.
Home ownership status is central to the asset test as different tests are applied to homeowners
and non-homeowners. At the same time, an individual’s principal place of residence is exempt
from the asset test making the asset test a function of homeowner status, but independent of the
5See Cobb-Clark and Hildebrand (2008) for details.
6At the time our data were collected, women were eligible for the age pension at age 63.
7In particular, in 2006 the ￿rst $38,400 of ￿nancial investments for a single person or the ￿rst $63,800 of ￿nancial
investments for a couple were deemed to have earned a return of 3 percent. Any remaining ￿nancial investments were
deemed to have earned 5 percent (FaHCSIA, 2009). Note that HILDA included two wealth modules in 2002 and 2006
making the age pension rules in place during these years the most relevant for this study.
3value of the principal residence. More precisely, in 2006, single homeowners with assets up to
$161,500 could receive full pensions, while single non-homeowners experienced a reduction in
their pension rate only after their assets had reached $278,500. The asset threshold for coupled
homeowners (non-homeowners) was $229,000 ($346,000).8
Cho and Sane (2009) argue that the favorable treatment of housing in the age-pension means
test leads to higher than average home ownership rates in Australia generally. One might also
expect households to rebalance their portfolios in such a way as to allocate more wealth towards
their principal residence and less wealth towards other assets upon reaching pension age. In par-
ticular, households may have an incentive to increase home equity and decrease equity in risky
(often liquid) assets with high yields. This would reduce the value of assets subject to the asset
test and would decrease the deemed income associated with ￿nancial wealth which factors into
the income test thus increasing the probability that a household quali￿es for the age pension under
both tests. More generally, households attempting to qualify for the age pension under the income
test may have an incentive to shift investments towards either less risky, non-￿nancial assets with
very low returns or towards life-style assets (e.g. cars, recreational vehicles, holiday homes) that
do not generate additional income.
Most importantly, many Australian retirees have the ability to take their employer-provided
pensions as lump sums, rather than as income steams, which exacerbates the in￿uence of means
testing the age pension (Atkinson, Creedy, and Knox, 1995). In particular, there are concerns that
themeanstestcreatesincentivesforolderAustralianstoreducetheirwealthatretirementbysimply
purchasing expensive consumer goods ￿ for example, by cashing out pensions to ￿nance expensive
holidays ￿ and then relying on the age pension. Atkinson, Creedy, and Knox (1999) investigate
the complex set of decisions which constitute the ‘retirement maze’ and conclude that Australian
households rarely face an obvious strategy for negotiating it. Despite this, their numerical analysis
demonstrates that the age-pension means test generates strong incentives for restructuring wealth
and consumption at retirement. Cho and Sane (2009), investigate this issue empirically, however,
and ￿nd little evidence that Australian households draw down their ￿nancial wealth in order to
qualify for the age pension. On the other hand, Barrett and Tseng (2008) argue that the fact that
Australian households above the pension-eligibility age continue to hold large assets rather than
converting them to an income stream may itself be evidence that the means test underlying the age
pension is affecting behavior.
Given this institutional context it seems reasonable to expect that the targeting of age pension
bene￿ts affects the incentives to accumulate wealth generally as well as to allocate wealth towards
some and away from other assets. Consequently, in what follows we analyze the link between
8Assets exceeding these exemption amounts reduced pension rates by $3 per fortnight for every $1000. Major
changes to the asset test rules have been introduced in September 2007. In particular, the level of pension bene￿ts are
now reduced by $1.50 per fortnight for every $1000 assets above the disregard level (see FaHCSIA, 2009, for further
details).
4means testing of the age pension and household wealth by focusing directly on the allocation of
wealth across asset types.
3 The HILDA Survey
The data come from the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey
which is a longitudinal survey of Australian households encompassing approximately 13,000 in-
dividual respondents living in more than 7,000 households. Our analysis relies on the 2002 and
2006 releases of HILDA (waves 2 and 6) which provide the only micro-level, longitudinal data on
household wealth holding in Australia (see Wooden, Freidin, and Watson, 2002; Heady, Marks,
and Wooden, 2005; Watson, 2009).
We have necessarily made a number of sample restrictions. Because household wealth can
be dif￿cult to measure and conceptualize in households with multiple families, we have dropped a
small number of multi-family households, all group households, and all related family households.
We have dropped all single- or couple-headed households in which the respondent (or his or her
partner) did not provide an interview. Finally, in order to maintain a suf￿ciently large sample of
households around retirement age, we restrict our sample to all households in which the reference
person is between 55 years and 74 years old. These restrictions result in a primary analysis sample
of 867 couple-headed households and 602 single-headed households in 2006. We also conduct a
range of sensitivity analyses using data from 927 couple-headed households and 582 single-headed
households in 2002.9
Most of HILDA’s wealth components are collected at the household level.10 In this paper, we
consider the way in which wealth is distributed across ￿ve broad asset types. We have de￿ned
these ￿ve asset types so as to capture the possible incentives to reallocate assets that are embedded
in the pre-2007 asset/income test rules for qualifying for the Australian age pension. Speci￿cally,
we focus on the following: net ￿nancial wealth, net business equity, net equity in own home,
life-style assets, and the total value of pension assets. Net ￿nancial wealth is calculated as the
total value of interest-bearing assets held in banks and other institutions, stocks and mutual funds,
life insurance funds, trust funds and collectibles minus the total value of unsecured debts (which
also include car loans). The net value (equity) of own home captures households’ equity in their
principal residence. Net business equity includes the net value of all business shares owned by
all household members. Life-style assets include all non-liquid assets which do not necessarily
generate a steady income stream including all transport and recreational vehicles (such as boats
or caravans) and all other real estates (such as holiday homes and other properties) owned by
9Couple-headed households include both married and cohabiting couples.
10See Heady (2003) for a detailed discussion of wealth measurement in HILDA.
5household members.11 The pension component of net worth includes the total amount of pension
capital owned by all household members.
HILDA does not use the concept of a reference person (or household head). Consequently, in
couple-headed households, we de￿ne the head of household to be the oldest partner. We then sepa-
rately account for the age of household heads and their spouses in the estimation model. Moreover,
our analysis considers single- and couple-headed households separately as these two groups face
different incentives given the asset- and income-test rules in place.
3.1 The Retirement Status of Older Australians
Our objective is to shed light on whether there is evidence that the incentives embedded in the asset
and income tests used to determine eligibility for the age pension lead older Australian households
to revise their portfolio allocation. Consequently, in our analysis we explicitly consider two sub-
populations. The ￿rst includes all households in which the reference person (or household head)
is between 55 and 64 years of age. Given that the reference person is de￿ned as the oldest partner
in a couple, very few household members in this age group are entitled to claim the age pension
(about 3 percent of all couple-headed households in 2006). The second subpopulation includes all
households in which the reference person is between 65 and 74 years old. This implies that in this
age group at least one household member has reached the age necessary to receive age pension
bene￿ts.
Webeginbyconsideringtheretirementstatusofindividualsinthesetwogroupsofhouseholds.
Information on relevant demographic characteristics and place of residence for individuals in our
estimation sample is reported in Table 1 for couple-headed households and in Table 2 for single
individuals. In each table, the ￿rst four columns report weighted sample means (and standard
deviations) from wave 2 of HILDA, while the last four columns report weighted sample means
(and standard deviations) using HILDA data from wave 6.
[Tables 1 and 2 HERE]
It is interesting to note that while most household members in younger households (i.e. those
in which the head is aged 55-64) are not eligible to claim age pension bene￿ts, in about 17 per-
cent (22 percent) of couples both partners nonetheless reported being retired in 2006 (2002). In
contrast, approximately 40 percent of single-headed households in this younger age group had al-
ready left the labor force over the same time period. Not surprisingly, the proportion of retirees
11We consider the total value of all vehicles, not vehicle equity because the amount of any car loans is combined
with other debts (such as other loans, hire purchase or overdraft) in the HILDA survey making it impossible to derive
a measure of vehicle equity.
6rises substantially after the age of 64. For instance, in 2006 (2002), at least 80 (83) percent of all
couple-headed households in this age range reported at least one household member being retired
while up to 87 (88) percent of single individuals between 65 and 74 years old were no longer in
the labor force in 2006 (2002).
3.2 Health Status and Wealth
Age pensioners are eligible to receive subsidies for health care or pharmaceuticals. As a result,
the incentives to qualify for the age pension might also be affected by the health status of future
claimants. Individuals in poor health may have greater incentives to reallocate their assets in order
to qualify for the age pension. We examine the impact of health using a measure of self-assessed
(non-fatal) health commonly used in the literature. Speci￿cally, HILDA respondents are asked to
ratetheirhealthona￿vepointscalelabeled: ‘excellent’, ‘verygood’, ‘good’, ‘fair’and‘poor’. We
use this information to create an indicator variable for poor health which is equal to one whenever
a respondent rates his or her health as either ‘fair’ or ‘poor’ and zero otherwise.
Tables 1 and 2 reveal that the incidence of poor health does not differ substantially across
household types with about 30 percent of reference persons reporting being in poor health. Sur-
prisingly, being older is also not associated with signi￿cant differences in self-reported health
status. For instance, approximately 27 (30) percent of married heads of household aged 55-64 re-
port being in poor health in comparison to 33 (27) percent of married household heads in the 65-74
age group in 2006 (2002) respectively. These differences in self-reported health status across age
groups are not statistically signi￿cant.12
Tables 3 and 4 present information about the relationship between net worth, asset portfolios
and self-reported health status. Being in good health is associated with a higher incidence of
owning each asset type as well as with holding more wealth in all asset types.13 For instance,
couple-headed households in which both partners report being in good heath hold over $300,000
more wealth at the median (and the mean) than couple-headed households in which at least one
spouse reports being in poor health. These results are in line with ￿ndings from US studies that
demonstrate the close link between health and wealth (Smith, 1999; Hurd and Kapteyn, 2003;
Michaud and van Soest, 2008). Given these differences in the level of net worth ￿ and the potential
incentives inherent in the age pension eligibility rules ￿ it is sensible to expect that health status
may affect the portfolio choices of older households.
[Tables 3 and 4 HERE]
12Test results are not reported but are available upon request.
13These differences across health status are both economically meaningful and statistically signi￿cant.
73.3 Age and Wealth
Descriptive statistics on household net worth, asset portfolios, and income are also presented for
couple-headed (Table 5) and single-headed (Table 6) households separately by age groups. These
results indicate that the median net worth of all Australian households grew substantially between
2002 and 2006. For example, couple-headed (single-headed) households aged 55-64 in 2006 had
a median wealth of about $137,000 (about $115,000) more than the same age group in 2002.14
Similar increases in median net worth occurred among older households over this period. This
widespread increase in wealth levels is not surprising given the exceptional boom in both the
equity and the real-estate markets which took place in these years.
[Tables 5 and 6 HERE]
The composition of wealth also appears to have changed over time. Despite their higher wealth
levels, couple-headed households aged 55-64 in 2006 held less ￿nancial wealth than their counter-
parts did in 2002 ($120,593 vs $161,339). At the same time, there has been a dramatic increase in
pension wealth which is consistent with the continuing expansion of the employer-pension system.
For example, couple-headed (single-headed) households aged 55-64 in 2006 held approximately
$67,000 ($34,000) more wealth in their pensions than the same age group did in 2002. Similar
growth over time is observed in the pension wealth of older Australian households. Over time,
younger households also appear to be holding more wealth in their homes. For example, couple-
headed households aged 55-64 in 2006 held $75,000 more wealth in house equity than did their
counterparts in 2002. These patterns suggest that over time Australian households reallocated
wealth from the ￿nancial market to their pensions and houses.
4 Regression Results
The descriptive results discussed above are useful in highlighting the broad differences in asset
portfolios across household type, age, health status, and time. At the same time, it is often dif-
￿cult to interpret these differences because the level of household wealth also varies with these
same characteristics. Consequently, we are often left comparing households that are not equally
wealthy. This is problematic because the nature of credit markets and ￿nancial institutions implies
that there is a link between total wealth and asset portfolios. We would like to know whether
changes in portfolios as households age can be attributed to the incentives inherent in the age pen-
sion eligibility rules or are merely the result of households spending down their wealth to ￿nance
consumption in retirement.
14These differences are statistically signi￿cant. All 2002 ￿gures are expressed in 2006 dollars. We use the ABS
CPI quarterly number for September as de￿ator.
8To gain a deeper understanding of these issues, we require a model which will allow us to
estimate the effect of means testing households’ access to a public pension (the Australian age
pension) on households’ portfolios. In other words, we need an estimation strategy that ￿rst,
recognizes that the propensity to invest in a speci￿c asset will depend on the types (and amounts)
of other assets held; second, compares households with the same level of net worth; and third,
allows us to control for other confounding factors like poor health. Therefore, we need to estimate
a system of regression equations with an adding up constraint imposed to account for total net
worth (see Blau and Graham, 1990). Consequently, we estimate the following reduced-form
model of asset composition:
sinh
￿1(Aik) = a0k + Yib1k + Xib2k + Aib3k + Wib4k + ￿ik (1)
where Aik is the dollar value of asset k that household i holds. We consider our ￿ve major asset
categories: ￿nancial wealth, business equity, equity in own home, life-style assets, and pension
funds. The vector Yi includes both total family gross income and a dummy variable capturing
whether household income is within the range of being able to collect the age pension.15 Moreover,
Xi is a vector which includes a measure of poor health as well as other demographic characteristics
re￿ecting a household’s life-cycle stage. In the case of single-headed households, we also control
for whether individuals are divorced or never married (with widowed constituting our reference
group). We allow households’ asset portfolios to depend on net worth (Wi) in order to account for
any capital market imperfections (such as credit constraints) which might vary across households
and be related to the decision to hold a particular asset. Finally, Ai is a vector (quadratic in age,
indicator for pension age) which accounts for both the effects of aging generally and any speci￿c
effects associated with reaching pension eligibility age.
We adopt an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (sinh￿1) of assets and income to account
for the potentially nonpositive and highly skewed nature of the distributions of these variables (see
Cobb-Clark and Hildebrand, 2006, for further discussion). Finally, equation (1) is estimated as
a system of equations and a set of cross-equation restrictions are imposed in order to satisfy the
adding-up requirement that the sum of assets across asset types equals net worth.16
We consider two model speci￿cations: 1) our baseline model as described above and 2) an
15The reported speci￿cation assumes that a household is in the range of eligibility when total household gross
income is +/- 10 percent of the relevant elibility threshold. We focus on this parameterization of income eligibility
because it is those households within close proximity of the income eligibility threshold which have the clearest
incentive to reallocate their assets in order to become eligible for the age pension. We also estimated an alternative
speci￿cation in which households with an income below the income threshold were considered to be income-eligible
for the age pension. These results do not differ substantially from those reported here and are available upon request.
16Speci￿cally, we require that the estimated marginal effect of an additional dollar of wealth sum to one across asset
types, while the marginal effect of a change in any other independent variable is restricted to sum to zero. Note that
while these constraints hold on average, they may not hold for any particular couple.
9extended model which allows the effect of reaching pension age to depend on self-reported health
status. Marginal effects and t-statistics from the estimation of these models using 2006 (wave 6)
HILDA data are presented in Tables 7 to 10 and are discussed in detail below.17 In Section 4.2, we
consider the substantive conclusions arising from this analysis in light of parallel results for 2002
and additional longitudinal evidence for the period 2002 to 2006.
4.1 The Determinants of Asset Portfolios
Given the estimation framework described above, the potential impact of the age pension on asset
portfolios is captured in two ways: ￿rst, through a measure of income eligibility and second,
through measures of age eligibility. Total wealth levels are held constant through the inclusion of
our measure of net worth. In effect, our results on asset composition are calculated for households
with average levels of wealth.
4.1.1 Education, Gender, and Marital History
Table 7 presents the results of our baseline model for couples. The results indicate that, with
the exception of age, partners’ characteristics are generally unrelated to a couple’s asset portfolio
once net worth and income are taken into account. Educational attainment is unrelated to asset
allocation, for example, and couples in which the head of household is female (i.e. those in which
the female partner is older) allocate their wealth across asset types in the same way as couples in
which the head of household is male. Moreover, couple-headed households in which the reference
person has been previously married hold their wealth in the same way as other couples.
[Table 7 HERE]
Gender and previous marital history appear to be more important in understanding the port-
folios of single-headed households (see Table 8). For example, single women allocate approx-
imately $185,000 AUD more wealth than comparable single men to their homes, while holding
almost $149,000 AUD less ￿nancial wealth and around $52,000 AUD less in life-style assets. Sin-
gle women also hold somewhat fewer business assets. Moreover, those who are divorced hold
more than $178,000 AUD less ￿nancial wealth than those who are widowed and not remarried.
Interestingly, single individuals who have never married allocate their wealth across asset types
in much the same way as equally wealthy widowers who have not remarried. The exception is
that they hold less (approximately $63,000 AUD) in life-style assets. Finally, consistent with our
17Marginal effects are calculated for each individual and then averaged over the relevant sub-sample using the
sample weights (see Greene, 1997, p. 876). Boot-strapped standard errors (with 500 replications) are used to calculate
the reported t-statistics.
10results for couples, educational attainment is unrelated to the way in which single individuals hold
their assets.
[Table 8 HERE]
4.1.2 Income and Income Eligibility
We turn now to consider the effects of income. Our baseline speci￿cation accounts both for the
linear effect of total family gross income as well as any additional effect of having an income level
within plus or minus 10 percent of the relevant age-pension income eligibility threshold. We ￿nd
that, not surprisingly, asset allocation is related to households’ current income levels. Comparing
households that are equally wealthy, we ￿nd that at higher income levels both couples and single
individuals hold signi￿cantly more wealth in pensions and business assets and signi￿cantly less
wealth in their own homes (see Tables 7 and 8). In addition, couples allocate more wealth to
life-style assets. For example, each additional dollar of income is associated with couples holding
$11.79 AUD less housing wealth, $6.61 AUD more pension wealth, $2.61 AUD more ￿nancial
assets, $2.32 AUD life-style assets, and $0.24 AUD more business assets.18 Singles individuals
reallocate their wealth in much the same way as their income grows, though the magnitude of these
effects are smaller.
Do households that have incomes close to the age-pension income eligibility threshold allocate
their wealth in particular ways over and above those patterns associated with income levels more
generally? Among couples, we do not ￿nd any signi￿cant effect of having a household income
in the range of income eligibility on asset portfolios. However, among singles, we ￿nd that being
within the income eligibility range is associated with holding signi￿cantly less wealth in one’s own
home (approximately $437,000 AUD) and more in both ￿nancial wealth (approximately $378,000
AUD) and life-style assets (approximately $53,000 AUD). This small increase in life-style assets
is consistent with the incentives inherent in the age-pension means test, though the sharp drop in
house equity is not.
4.1.3 Age and Age Eligibility
Given the cross-sectional nature of our analysis, we cannot explicitly control for birth cohorts. As
a result, any estimated effect of age on the level of any particular asset captures both differences
across birth cohorts in the allocation of assets as well as any effect due to aging (life-cycle stages).
18Note that these marginal effects are constrained to sum to zero in order to hold net worth constant. In other words,
these results indicate how couples (with average net worth) reallocate their constant net worth across asset types as
their income grows.
11This implies that in order to understand the potential effect of reaching pension age on asset allo-
cation, it is necessary to also account for the effects of aging more generally. Consequently, our
baseline speci￿cation controls for a quadratic in age as well as indicator variables which re￿ect
whether or not the head of household (and his or her spouse) have reached the relevant pension
age.19
We ￿nd that, not surprisingly, there is a relationship between household members’ age and
the way that household wealth is allocated. Everything else equal, each additional year of age for
heads is associated with couples holding more ￿nancial wealth (approximately $40,000 AUD) and
less pension wealth (approximately $22,000 AUD) (see Table 7). Single individuals also reallocate
more of their net worth to ￿nancial wealth and less of their net worth to pension wealth as they age
(see Table 8). These results are consistent with the opportunities that many Australian households
have to convert employer-based pension wealth at retirement to lump sum bene￿ts which can be
invested in the ￿nancial market to provide a future income stream.
It is striking, however, that in general there is little additional effect of couples or single indi-
viduals reaching pension eligibility age over and above this effect of aging more generally. Thus,
for the vast majority of Australians aged 55 - 74 there is no additional effect of reaching pension
age on portfolio allocations. The disparity in the asset portfolios of younger and older households
in this age range appears to largely stem from life-cycle changes (i.e. aging) rather than from
changes associated speci￿cally with reaching pension eligibility age. The exception is that cou-
ples in which both partners have reached pension age hold more ￿nancial wealth (approximately
$235,000 AUD) and less pension wealth (approximately $428,000 AUD) than otherwise similar
couples in which only the oldest partner has reached pension age. It is important to note, however,
that there are no signi￿cant differences in the housing equity or life style assets of these couples.
This suggests that although the forms of income generating wealth differ by the age eligibility of
spouses, there appears to be no difference in the propensity to hold housing and life-style assets
relative to assets which generate an income stream. These patterns do not appear to be consistent
with the incentives inherent in the age pension means tests.
4.1.4 Health Status
In Australia, age pensioners also receive subsidies for health care, pharmaceuticals, public trans-
port, utilities and rent assistance which may lead those in poor health to have an additional incen-
tive to qualify for an age pension in order to take advantage of these various additional, lump-sum
bene￿ts. We investigate this by assessing whether there is evidence of an interaction between poor
health and having reached pension age on asset portfolios. Speci￿cally, results (marginal effects
19Accounting for aging through a cubic and quartic resulted in substantially the same results. In all cases, we report
a marginal effect of age which accounts for both terms in the quadratic.
12and t-statistics) from our second speci￿cation which allows for this interaction are presented in
Tables 9 (couples) and 10 (singles). We compare these results to those from our baseline model
(see Tables 7 and 8).
Using our baseline speci￿cation and ignoring interaction effects, we ￿nd that couple-headed
households in which at least one member is in poor health have approximately $164,000 AUD
more equity in their homes and almost $49,000 AUD less in life-style assets than similar couples
with equal net worth in which both partners are in good health (see Table 7). These differences
re￿ect the effects of poor health generally on couples’ optimal asset allocation. Interestingly, there
is no signi￿cant effect of poor health on the asset allocation of single individuals (see Table 8).
Adding an interaction term to this baseline speci￿cation allows us to distinguish the asset port-
folios of households that have reached pension age in good health from those that have reached
pension age in poor health.20 This exercise sheds light on whether or not the health care bene￿ts
associated with the age pension seem to be associated with those in poor health (and who presum-
ably most value these additional health care bene￿ts) holding their wealth differently to similar
pensioners in good health. At the same time, the presence of an interaction term alters the in-
terpretation of the estimated coef￿cient on pension eligibility age and poor health making these
effects not directly comparable across models.21
The results indicate that in general there is no relationship between having reached pension
age and the asset allocation of either couples of single individuals who report that they are in
good health. The exception is that healthy couples hold less pension and more ￿nancial wealth
once the spouse also reaches pension age in comparison to healthy couples in which only the
head is of pension age (see Table 9). As discussed above (see Section 4.1.3) these patterns are
not consistent with the incentives generated by the means tests underlying the age pension rules.
Given this, there is little to suggest that the means test underlying the Australian age pension is
leading healthy households to reallocate assets.
Table 9 and 10 Here
On the other hand, there is evidence that poor health affects the asset allocations of younger
households that have not yet reached pension age. Couples in which neither partner is of pension
age have approximately $230,000 AUD more equity in their homes and approximately $61,000
AUD less in life-style assets if at least one partner reports being in poor health. In contrast, single
individualswhoarebelowpensionageandinpoorhealthhaveapproximately$258,000AUDmore
20In the case of couples, we interact poor health status (speci￿cally, at least one partner reporting poor health) with
the pension eligibility indicator for each partner.
21In particular, in the interacted model the estimated coef￿cient on pension eligability age relects the effect for
healthy households, while the estimated coef￿cient on poor health re￿ects the effect for households less than pension
age.
13￿nancial wealth than healthy singles of a similar age. This advantage in ￿nancial wealth position
is balanced by a reduction in all other asset types. These health effects on portfolio allocations are
unlikely to be generated by the incentive to claim an age pension because these households have
not reached the age at which it is possible to claim the age pension.
This relationship between poor health and asset allocation differs in households that have
reached pension age, however. In particular, single individuals who are above pension age and
in poor health hold signi￿cantly less ￿nancial wealth and signi￿cantly more housing than younger
singles who are also in poor health. So the effect of poor health in increasing the ￿nancial wealth
position of singles is concentrated amongst those below pension age. Singles above pension age
who are in poor health have substantially more of their net worth in housing and substantially less
in ￿nancial assets both of which are consistent with the age-pension means test.
In contrast, there is very little difference in the effect of poor health on the asset allocations of
older versus younger couples. Among those in poor health, ￿nancial wealth is somewhat higher
andhomeequityissomewhatloweriftheheadofhouseholdhasreachedpensionableage, however,
these difference are almost completely reversed once his or her spouse reaches pensionable age.
Thus, to the extent that poor health provides additional incentives reshape assets in order to quality
for the Australian age pension, this appears to be concentrated among single-headed households.
4.1.5 Summary
Taken together, these results provide little support for the view that households are reallocating
their portfolios in order to maximize their eligibility for the Australian age pension. There is evi-
dence that singles over pension age and in poor health hold signi￿cantly more equity in their own
homes and signi￿cantly fewer ￿nancial assets than singles who are in poor health, but who are not
above pension age. Moreover, single-headed households with income in the eligible range allocate
slightly more wealth to life-style assets. Both effects are consistent with the incentives inherent in
the age pension asset test. At the same time, single-headed households who are income-eligible
for the age pension have signi￿cantly less equity in their homes and signi￿cantly more ￿nancial
wealth which is not consistent with the preferential treatment of primary residences. Moreover,
we do not see similar patterns in couples’ asset holdings. Couples who have incomes that would
qualify them for the age pension allocate their wealth across assets in the same way as couples
who are not and there is no relationship between heads of households having reached pension age
on the asset portfolios of couples. Finally, we do not see a signi￿cant effect of the household head
having reached pension age on the asset holdings of either couple- or single-headed households in
which the head (and his or her partner) are in good health.
Thus, there is little evidence that the means test underlying the Australian age pension is
leading healthy households or couples to reallocate assets. If there is any effect of the incentives
14inherent in the age-pension means test, these appear to predominately affect the behavior of single
individuals who are in poor health.
4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
We conduct two additional analyses in order to gage the robustness of our conclusions. First, we
conduct a parallel analysis using our 2002 HILDA data. Although there were slight adjustments
to the age-pension means test between HILDA waves, the same general incentives for asset real-
location were also present in 2002. Thus, an analysis of 2002 provides some reassurance that our
conclusions are not speci￿c to the particular economic conditions that existed in 2006. Second,
we use the limited number of households that did not change types and that provided wealth data
in both waves to test whether there are signi￿cant differences between 2002 and 2006 in the asset
accumulation (or deccumulation) of households that did and did not reach pension age.
The 2002 results are presented in Tables A1 - A4 in the appendix. Like our 2006 results,
estimates based on wave 2 of HILDA do indicate some independent effect of spouses reaching
pension age on the portfolio allocation of couples (see Table A1). In particular, couples in which
both partners were eligible for the age pension held signi￿cantly more housing and signi￿cantly
less pension wealth than did other couples in which only the head has reached pension age. Unlike
the case in 2006, in 2002 single individuals who had reached pension age held signi￿cantly more
wealth in their own homes than did other singles (see Table A2) which is consistent with the
preferential treatment of housing in the age pension means tests. In addition, when we account
for the potential interaction between the effects of poor health and pension age eligibility, we
￿nd that in 2002 there was an effect of reaching pension age on the asset allocations of healthy
households. Speci￿cally, healthy households (both single- and couple-headed) in which the head
is above pension age held substantially more wealth in their homes than healthy households that
were younger. Higher levels of home equity among these households is consistent with preferential
treatment of housing wealth in the means tests underlying the age pension. Thus, our 2002 results
are broadly consistent with those based on 2006 data. The exception is that in 2002 there is also
evidence that healthy households above pension age held signi￿cantly more wealth in their homes
than did otherwise similar younger households. In 2006 any effect of the age pension means test
on home equity appears to have been concentrated among single-headed households in poor health
Tables A1 - A4 Here
Unfortunately, the sample of households that did not change their status, i.e., were either
single- or couple-headed in both waves, and reported wealth data in both waves 2 and 6 is rel-
atively small.22 Consequently, it is not possible to undertake the simultaneous estimation of a
22There are 539 couple-headed and 344 single-headed households meeting both conditions.
15system of asset change equations. Instead, we create an indicator variable identifying those house-
holds in which at least one member has become eligible for the age pension versus those in which
there was no change in eligibility between the two waves. We then test whether the speci￿c assets
of those households which become eligible grew (or shrank) in way that differed from the assets
held by households which remained ineligible.
Table 11 presents the average change in net worth and asset levels between 2006 and 2002 for
those households present in both HILDA waves. Among couples, we ￿nd a (real) increase in all
assets except business equity irrespective of pension eligibility status. However, we do not ￿nd any
statistically signi￿cant differences in the magnitude of these changes between those households
which have become eligible for the age pension and those which have not (see p-values in the third
column). The same result holds for singles with the exception that levels of ￿nancial wealth appear
to have increased more among households which have become eligible for the age pension.
[Table 11 about here]
Taken together, these longitudinal comparisons seem to corroborate the main ￿ndings from our
cross-sectional analysis of 2006 HILDA data that the variation the portfolio choices of Australian
households provides little evidence that the asset and income tests underlying the age pension are
triggering substantial changes in the way households hold their wealth.
5 Conclusions
The ability of government pension reforms to shape households’ retirement savings depends in
large part on the way that households alter savings levels and asset allocations in response to spe-
ci￿c institutional arrangements. In particular, means testing can help governments reduce their
overall pension costs by way of increased targeting, but may also provide the incentive for house-
holds to reallocate their wealth in particular ways. We contribute to the growing literature on the
effects of public pension systems on household savings by using detailed nationally-representative
data for Australia to estimate a system of asset equations which are constrained to add up net
worth. By making comparisons across equally wealthy households, we are able to focus attention
on whether or not households appear to reallocate assets in order to qualify for a public pension.
Taken together, our results provide very little evidence that in 2006 healthy households or cou-
ples are responding to the incentives embedded in the asset and income tests used to determine
Australian age pension eligibility by reallocating their assets. While there are some signi￿cant
differences in asset portfolios associated with having an income near the income threshold, being
of pensionable age, and being in poor health these differences are often only marginally signi￿-
cant, are not robust across time, and are not clearly consistent with the incentives inherent in the
16Australian age pension eligibility rules. Any behavioral response to the incentives inherent in the
age-pension means test in 2006 appears to be predominately concentrated among single pension-
ers who are in poor health. In 2002 there is also evidence that healthy households above pension
age held signi￿cantly more wealth in their homes than did otherwise similar younger households
perhaps suggesting some reduction in the incentives to reallocate assets over time.
At the same time it is important to note that our analysis has focused on the asset allocation of
Australians aged 55 to 74. This allows us to reduce concerns about unobserved heterogeneity by
focusing on a relatively narrow age band around pension age while at the same time maintaining an
adequate estimation sample. However, if households are making portfolio decisions in response
to the means test more than 10 years before reaching pension age, our estimates understate the
effect of the means test on asset allocation. Given the large numbers of Australians who appear to
delay planning for retirement (Cobb-Clark and Stillman, 2009), we do not think this is likely, but
we cannot be certain. Moreover, we have had nothing to say about the effect of the Australian age
pension on overall retirement savings. Much of the Australian public debate has centered on the
incentives to reallocate assets in response to the age-pension means test (see Atkinson, Creedy, and
Knox, 1995; Barrett and Tseng, 2008; Cho and Sane, 2009), however, it seems sensible to expect
some effect on savings levels as well.
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30Table 11: Changes in Assets Holding by Change in Eligibility to AP
Couples Singles
Change in Eligibility Change in Eligibility
Yes No P-value Yes No P-value
Wealth 127333 180946 0.314 133259 81921 0.264
Financial Wealth 24222 20772 0.941 37086 -7841 0.047
Business -21745 -12782 0.649 -10082 972 0.552
Own Home 65846 95090 0.426 64153 56289 0.554
Lifestyle 33567 35645 0.942 39115 11263 0.508
Superannuation 25443 42220 0.513 2986 21238 0.301
N 120 419 75 269
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